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I. Introduction
[T]he Hobby Lobby decision will reverberate across corporate
America. It will reshape fundamentally how business people,
lawyers, legal and business scholars (particularly, corporate
law professors), as well as ordinary citizens, think about the
permitted objectives of business corporations in a free society,
objectives that extend far beyond those that are religiously
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motivated and into the larger realm of corporate social
responsibility of all kinds.1
Law . . . mandates—with the state’s full sanctioning power
behind it—compliance with specified standards of behavior.
Apart from a decision to comply or disobey, there is no real
exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law.
“Responsible” conduct, on the other hand, presupposes the
freedom to engage in or refrain from certain conduct. Viewed
this way, corporate responsibility concerns can be seen as
picking up precisely where legal strictures leave off. 2

With deep appreciation and admiration for the work of
Lyman Johnson and David Millon, I offer this contribution to the
Symposium that honors them and their scholarship. The
language quoted above provides the foundation for this Essay.
The first quotation describes the potentially significant
implications of the now three-year-old Supreme Court case,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,3 for understanding corporate
purpose and corporate social responsibility. The second quotation
from Johnson’s work distinguishes between what companies are
required to do (they must comply with applicable law) and what
companies choose to do for the betterment of society’s individuals
and institutions (corporate social responsibility).
I mentioned in my presentation at the Symposium that I
have a narrow but significant quibble with Johnson’s assertion in
the second quotation that, when it comes to compliance, “there is
no real exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law.”4 I
think that there is a great amount of discretion to be exercised by
corporate officers when it comes to compliance. It is discretion
relating to how the corporation will “abide by the law.”5 In other
* Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of
Law.
1. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 2–3 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby].
2. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2012)
[hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Personhood]
3. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), aff’g 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), rev’g 724 F.3d 377 (3d
Cir. 2013). After granting certiorari, both cases were consolidated. Sebelius v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
4. Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135.
5. Id.
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words, the discretion is not limited to the choice of whether to
follow the law, but is found in the choices corporate officers make,
sometimes implicitly, about whether to follow the spirit of the law
or merely the letter of the law. The discretion is exercised when
making decisions about how compliance programs are created
and implemented, and how their effectiveness is assessed.
I quibble also with Johnson’s observation that “corporate
responsibility concerns can be seen as picking up precisely where
legal strictures leave off.”6 Compliance with the legal strictures
Johnson speaks of is an important part of corporate governance.7
It seems to me, however, that the line between corporate
governance and corporate social responsibility is blurred. While
law compliance is mandated, the quality of that compliance is
within corporate officers’ discretion.8 Officers may decide to do
the bare minimum when it comes to compliance.9 Compliance
programs are sometimes mere window dressing or cosmetic in
nature.10 The decision to create robust compliance programs that
take seriously the substance of legal strictures is not only good
corporate governance; it is socially responsible.11 I believe there is
6. Id.
7. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) (“For
corporations operating in regulated industries, compliance with the applicable
laws is essential . . . . Thus, the avoidance of a regulatory crisis may be as
significant to the corporation's long-term well-being as is strategic planning and
product innovation.”).
8. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics and Compliance
Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 800–01 (2014) (“Particularly in times of shrinking
budgets and restricted resources it would be very helpful to have some evidence
to demonstrate why a solid compliance program is needed—and why a better
program is worth the effort versus a bare bones minimum.” (citing ETHICS RES.
CTR., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY
YEARS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION AND RECOGNITION OF
EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS 44 (2012))).
9. See id. at 800–01, 821 (discussing the possibility of minimum
investment in compliance as a means of corporate policy or management).
10. See HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N, IS YOUR COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
EFFECTIVE OR MERELY WINDOW DRESSING? (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.hccainfo.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Conference_Handouts/Compliance_Institute/
2014/mon/211print2.pdf (highlighting “Hallmarks of [Compliance] Window
Dressing” in the healthcare industry).
11. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Compliance: A Functional Convergence, FOLEY HOAG (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/08/11/corporate-social-responsibility-and-
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a great deal of overlap between corporate governance and
corporate social responsibility and very little precision in
understanding where corporate governance ends and corporate
social responsibility begins.
At the Symposium, Johnson offered an observation about my
presentation during the question and answer period. “Compliance
is substance, the duty of care is process,” he said.12 Johnson’s
insight helps to frame and clarify my thesis in this Essay. The
substance about which Johnson speaks is found in the legal
mandates—i.e., the law to which corporations must comply.13 The
process to which he refers is the stuff of corporate governance.14
The process includes a board’s decision to establish a compliance
program.15 The process also relates to the measures undertaken
by corporate officers who are responsible for the implementation
and management of compliance programs.16 These processes are
undertaken by corporate officers in order to fulfill the fiduciary
duties they owe their shareholders and the corporation for whom
they serve.17 A commitment to taking compliance obligations
seriously must become part of the fabric of corporate culture.18
compliance-a-functional-convergence/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“There are
strong business reasons, therefore, to leverage and integrate CSR commitments
and compliance processes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Symposium, Corporate Law, Governance, and Purpose: A Tribute to the
Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677
(2017).
13. See Baccei v. United States, 632 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Full
compliance is necessary when the requirement relates to the substance of the
statute or where the essential purposes have not been fulfilled.” (citing Shotgun
Delivery, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2001))).
14. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C-06-06110-SBA (JCS),
2008 WL 5382544, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008) (“As corporate debacles such
as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom demonstrate, strong corporate governance is
fundamental to the economic well-being and success of a corporation.”).
15. See Brown, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing the role of the board and
compliance personnel to take measures ensuring that the laws are dutifully
observed).
16. See id. at 108 (“Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the
organization must have been assigned overall responsibility to oversee
compliance with such standards and procedures.”).
17. See generally id. But see Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 16–17 (2013) (arguing that compliance standards impose
higher expected costs on corporations than the standard under Caremark).
18. See Brown, supra note 7, at 6 (“For corporations operating in regulated
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Boards must demand that adequate compliance programs are
installed and diligently implemented.19 Once installed, corporate
officers do the work of implementing compliance programs.20
Johnson’s work is illuminating on the link between effective
compliance and the advice that officers get from in-house counsel
concerning their fiduciary duties.21 Johnson and Millon’s work
regarding corporate personhood and purpose is also relevant to
my thesis in this Essay about the overlap, interplay, and
interaction between corporate governance and corporate social
responsibility.22
I begin the Essay with an examination of the overlap
between
corporate
governance
and
corporate
social
responsibility.23 After doing so, I explore the notions of corporate
personhood and purpose in order to suggest ways to make
compliance programs less cosmetic and defensive and more
meaningful and effective.24 I conclude that the decision-making
inherent in corporate governance is an important factor in the
corporate social responsibility equation.25 There is a gap that
separates the fulfillment of fiduciary duties (including the
installation and upkeep of a compliance program) and best
practices.26 Companies and their managers can win litigation, or
industries, compliance with the applicable laws is essential.”).
19. See id. (discussing the various guidelines in place to ensure that
corporations implement satisfactory compliance programs).
20. See id. at 119–127 (generally describing the function and procedure
that should be followed by compliance officials in implementing effective
compliance programs).
21. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1;
Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2; Johnson, Corporate Governance,
infra note 70; Johnson & Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are
Fiduciaries, infra note 105; Johnson, Business Judgment, infra note 111;
Johnson & Garvis, infra note 113.
22. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1;
Johnson & Millon, infra note 105.
23. See infra notes 28–81 and accompanying text (discussing the overlap
between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility).
24. See infra notes 120–152 and accompanying text (exploring issues of
corporate personhood and purpose); infra notes 235–281 (discussing the effect of
corporate personhood corporate purpose).
25. See infra notes 320–334 and accompanying text (concluding that the
decision-making portion of corporate governance is an integral part of corporate
social responsibility).
26. See Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 339 F. Supp. 2d. 78, 82 n.1 (D.C.
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perhaps even avoid litigation, that alleges fiduciary duty breach
by doing the bare minimum.27 But, what can inspire them to
adhere to best practices, particularly when it comes to installing
and maintaining an effective compliance program? My answer to
this question in this Essay requires an exploration of how
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are not
clearly separate, and an examination of corporate personhood and
purpose that may inspire businesses to adhere to best practices.
II. Good Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility
I begin my discussion about how to make corporate
compliance programs meaningful and effective by looking at
definitions of compliance, corporate governance, and corporate
social responsibility (CSR).
According to the Financial Times, “CSR is a concept with
many definitions and practices.”28 CSR can be defined in a way
that focuses on the impact of corporate activity on the
constituencies that are affected by the decisions that corporate
agents and actors make.29 These constituencies include corporate
stakeholders—employees, creditors, consumers, suppliers, and
the communities in which a company conducts business.30 Some
definitions of CSR look beyond stakeholders to the effects of a
company’s activities on general social wellbeing.31 Like Johnson,
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he term ‘best practices’ often tends to be murky and
ambiguous.”).
27. See Stucke, supra note 8, at 800–01, 821 (discussing the possibility of
minimum investment in compliance as a means of corporate policy or
management).
28. Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), FIN. TIMES,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR)
(last
visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See id. (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a business approach
that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, social and
environmental benefits for all stakeholders.”).
30. See Definition of Stakeholders, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.
com/Term?term=stakeholders (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Typical stakeholders
that define most businesses are customers, employees, suppliers, communities,
and shareholders or other financiers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
31. See Corporate Social Responsibility, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/c/corp-social-responsibility.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2017)
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those who subscribe to this way of defining CSR look beyond
what is required by law to protect stakeholders, looking instead
to the discretion that corporate managers and officers may
exercise in choosing to benefit society by doing something extra
for the people (whether stakeholders or not) touched by corporate
activity.32
Sometimes CSR definitions make no reference to
stakeholders or the company’s impact on the public’s wellbeing.33
These definitions focus on society and general social welfare, not
how companies impact stakeholders or other members of society
with whom the company comes in contact.34 For example, one
commentator described CSR as the “business practices involving
initiatives that benefit society.”35
Definitions of Corporate Governance are also conceptually
varied.36 Investopedia defines corporate governance as “the
system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is
directed and controlled . . . . [E]ssentially [it] involves balancing
the interests of a company’s many stakeholders, such as
shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financiers,
government and the community.”37 Robert Monks and Nell
Minow define corporate governance as “the relationship among
(“[CSR] is a corporation’s initiatives to assess and take responsibility for the
company’s effects on environmental and social wellbeing. The term generally
applies to efforts that go beyond what may be required by regulation or
environmental protection groups.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
32. See Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135
(distinguishing between CSR and the governance procedures implemented in
accordance with “legal strictures”).
33. See Sammi Caramela, What is Corporate Social Responsibility, BUS.
NEWS DAILY (June 27, 2016, 12:12 PM), www.businessnewsdaily.com/4679corporate-social-responsibility.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (referencing CSR
as a business’ relationship to society generally, while making no mention of
stakeholders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See id. (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to business
practices involving initiatives that benefit society.”).
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text (providing definitions of
“corporate governance” that vary depending on the focus given responsibilities
to shareholders over other parties).
37. Corporate Governance, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/
c/corporategovernance.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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various participants in determining the direction and
performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the
shareholders, (2) the management (led by the chief executive
officer), and (3) the board of directors . . . . Other participants
include the employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and the
community.”38 These definitions of corporate governance look
beyond shareholders and managers and include stakeholders.39
In these definitions, there is an obvious overlap between
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in the
inclusion of stakeholders, including the community, when
defining both concepts.40
Monks and Minow, however, see shareholders, management,
and boards as the primary participants in corporate governance.41
Under their definition, the primary focus in corporate governance
is on processes, practices, policies, and norms that are internal to
the corporation.42 In contrast to this, when considering CSR, the
primary focus looks beyond internal constituents, the
stakeholders, or, under many definitions, beyond stakeholders to
general social welfare and wellbeing.43 Internal matters and
decision-making are the focal point of corporate governance.44
External matters are at the center of CSR considerations.45 This
boundary that separates the external from the internal when
distinguishing corporate governance from CSR, however, is far
38. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 75 (2d ed.
2001).
39. See supra note 30 (“Typical stakeholders that define most businesses
are customers, employees, suppliers, communities, and shareholders or other
financiers.”).
40. Compare supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (highlighting the
relationship between CSR and stakeholders), with supra notes 33–39 and
accompanying text (highlighting the relationship between corporate governance
and stakeholders).
41. See generally MONKS & MINOW, supra note 38 and accompanying text
(stating that the primary participants in corporate governance are shareholders,
management, and boards of directors).
42. Id.
43. See Caramela, supra note 33 (defining CSR).
44. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 (3d
ed. 2004) (focusing on “the three most significant players in the corporate
process: shareholders, managers, and directors”).
45. See Caramela, supra note 33 (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR)
refers to business practices involving initiatives that benefit society.”).
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from clear.46 Both concepts are defined by referring to both
internal constituencies (shareholders, officers, and directors) and
external groups (stakeholders and communities).47
The line of demarcation that separates corporate governance
from CSR is further blurred by the fact that an important aspect
of corporate governance includes compliance work.48 Corporate
compliance, like CSR and corporate governance, involves policies
and practices that are both internal and external to the
corporation.49 Compliance involves “the processes by which an
organization seeks to ensure that employees and other
constituents conform to applicable norms—which can include
either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal
rules of the organization.”50 Additionally, “[t]he contemporary
compliance function serves a core governance function. . . . But,
unlike other governance structures, its origins are exogenous to
the firm.”51
Compliance involves internal governance processes to comply
with law, regulations, and norms created by sources that are
external to the firm.52 It is clear that, as Johnson wrote, “there is
46. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing
corporate governance as dealing with both internal players—shareholders,
managers, and directors—and external considerations—employees, the
community, etc.).
47. Compare supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (defining CSR with
reference to both internal and external constituencies), with supra notes 33–39
and accompanying text (defining corporate governance with reference to both
internal and external constituencies).
48. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary
Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 393, 425–26 (2007) (“Internal control systems pervade every corporate
enterprise, and include systems designed to provide assurances as to the
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and
compliance with law.”).
49. See id. at 395–97, 425–426 (discussing the public impact of poor
corporate governance and the need to balance interests of the corporation and
its stockholders).
50. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014).
51. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2078 (2016).
52. See id. at 2079 (“[T]he imposition of intrafirm governance from
extrafirm sources introduces a host of outside interests and incentives into firm
decision making.”).
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no real exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law.”53
The type of internal processes that encourage compliance,
however, and the extent to which a company takes them
seriously, is voluntary and discretionary.54 Even the decision
about whether to adopt a compliance program involves a certain
amount of discretion.55
CSR, on the other hand, is almost entirely discretionary and
includes things like charitable donations.56 This is the something
extra that companies do to be good citizens—to be responsible.57
But CSR can also be intertwined with internal processes that
involve compliance.58 Companies can, and too often do, install
programs that monitor compliance with the letter of the law
rather than the spirit of the law.59 These companies behave in a
way that is socially irresponsible when they spend large sums of

53. Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135. Even the
strictest adherents to shareholder primacy and wealth maximization
acknowledge that all firms must comply with applicable law even in their quest
to maximize profits. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS xvii (2013)
[T]he economist Milton Friedman argues that business executives
should act in accordance with the desires of the company’s owners,
“which generally will be to make as much money as possible.”
Friedman also agrees, however, that the executive must also do so
“while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.
Id.
54. See Stucke, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the degree
of discretion afforded officers in compliance).
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1) (2016) (stating that “the
board of directors may” create a given committee for whatever specified purpose
the board may define (emphasis added)).
56. See Caramela, supra note 33 (including philanthropy, volunteering, and
environmental preservation efforts as categories of CSR).
57. See id. (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to business
practices involving initiatives that benefit society. A business's CSR can
encompass a wide variety of tactics, from giving away a portion of a company's
proceeds to charity, to implementing ‘greener’ business operations.”).
58. See Ronen Shamir, Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The Case of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 531, 534–35 (2010)
(highlighting studies involving various types of compliance and their
relationship to the self-regulation that is integral to CSR compliance).
59. See Stucke, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the
potential to do “bare bones minimum” in terms of compliance).
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money on compliance programs that are not effective and
meaningful.60
A company that behaves in a socially responsible way will
take compliance seriously.61 One way to do this is to avoid the
check-the-box approach to creating and implementing compliance
programs.62 Installation of a program is only the first step. A
socially responsible company will make sure that problems are
addressed when compliance measures uncover them.63
Responsible companies will work hard to prevent recurring
wrongdoing.64 Socially responsible companies will protect
whistleblowers (not just say they do) so that there are no
repercussions for employees who report wrongdoing.65
Effective compliance programs require information flow from
employees who are deep “in the interior of the organization” to
senior managers and executives who are charged with monitoring
law compliance.66 And, senior managers must adequately
60. See Aaron Chatterji & Siona Listokin, Corporate Social Responsibility,
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS (Winter 2007), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/3/
corporate-social-irresponsibility/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (evaluating the
actual success of CSR campaigns on effecting corporate behavior because large
companies are simply better able to spend large amounts of money on CSR and
compliance) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See Shamir, supra note 58, at 539 (describing CSR as “a set of practices
that lie beyond compliance,” with legal mechanism compliance as a baseline).
62. See generally Cindy Yanasak & Eileen Xenarios, Culture-Shift: Moving
from a Check-the-Box Mentality to One of Ethical Performance, COMPLIANCE &
ETHICS INST.—SOC’Y CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS
(Sept. 2014),
http://www.slideshare.net/theSCCE/culture-shift-moving-from-a-checktheboxmentality-to-one-of-ethical-performance (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See Brown, supra note 7, at 131 (“[T]he company must be vigilant in
preventing possible violations and in responding to violations that occur by
taking appropriate remedial measures and disciplinary action.”).
64. See id. at 131 (“A compliance program should be grounded on legal and
regulatory requirements that are applicable and specifically, the requirements
that govern the particular business activities of the corporation.”).
65. See Tim Barnett, Why Your Company Should Have a Whistleblowing
Policy, SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 1992, at 37–42 (encouraging the
adoption of policies that protect and encourage the reporting of concerns and
whistleblowing).
66. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“As the facts of this case graphically demonstrate, ordinary
business decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper in the
interior of the organization can, however, vitally affect the welfare of the
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communicate with mid-level managers and low-level employees
about the firm’s compliance goals and requirements.67 This
information is conveyed in employee training programs.68
The impact a company has on communities, on labor, on
consumers, as both Johnson and Millon have noted in their work,
is regulated by environmental, labor and consumer laws that
have nothing to do with corporate governance.69 The laws that
protect stakeholders are external to the corporation.70 But the
nature and adequacy of a company’s compliance with law is an
internal corporate governance matter.71 Has the company
installed a compliance program just to be able to defend itself
against litigation or prosecution? Is the compliance program
merely cosmetic window dressing? Affirmative answers to these
questions mean that the company’s behavior is not socially
responsible.
corporation and its ability to achieve its various strategic and financial goals.”).
But see Bullard, supra note 17, at 16–17 (concluding that Caremark is an
inadequate source for encouraging legal compliance and arguing that the
agencies that are charged with enforcing laws are the most able to encourage
corporations to comply with applicable law).
67. See Corder v. United States, 107 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting
an alternative monetary sanction instead of disqualification sanction to a store
owner by virtue of the store owner’s comprehensive compliance policy and
effective employee training program).
68. See id. at 597 (finding that employer had engaged in comprehensive
employee training programs).
69. See, e.g., David Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Environmental Sustainability, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL
BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 35 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds.,
2015) (highlighting the relationship of compliance to environmental law and
corporate social responsibility).
70. See Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility:
Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 981–82 (2013) [hereinafter
Johnson, Corporate Governance] (detailing the distinction between external
“positive law” and internal “soft law,” laws such as Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–
Frank that focus on shareholder interest from outside the internal mechanism
of the corporate governance).
71. See id. at 981
[Sarbanes-Oxley] corresponded with growth in the promulgation of
“soft law” associated with corporate activity. Corporations
increasingly adopted internal codes of conduct and committee
charters . . . . These various nonbinding initiatives did not have the
legal “bite” of positive law, but they served to alter internally the
evolving normative expectations as to what responsible corporate
conduct should look like.
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A socially responsible company takes compliance with law
seriously.72 It measures the effectiveness of its compliance
programs on a regular basis.73 If there are shortcomings in the
program, or if problems are discovered, a socially responsible
company quickly and effectively deals with them.74 Adequate
compliance programs protect stakeholders’ interests.75 They may
also impact social welfare in general.76 This is the definition of
CSR.77 In other words, effective compliance is good corporate
governance and these internal processes have benefits that
reverberate beyond the corporation’s shareholders and managers
to reach its stakeholders and the general public.78 This is the crux
of my disagreement with Johnson when he wrote that “corporate
responsibility concerns can be seen as picking up precisely where
72. See Shamir, supra note 58, at 539 (describing CSR as “a set of practices
that lie beyond compliance,” with legal mechanism compliance as a baseline).
73. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Compliance: Commitment at the Top, FOLEY HOAG (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/09/21/corporate-social-responsibility-andcompliance-commitment-at-the-top/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Moments of
crisis are not the time for corporate leaders to realize that a company’s
commitments, often prominently displayed on websites and in glossy reports,
have not been effectively implemented. On an ongoing basis, top-level
management and the board are in a position to raise questions regarding the
processes . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. Id.
75. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Compliance: Building Capacity to Respond to Stakeholder Demands, FOLEY
HOAG (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/08/18/corporatesocial-responsibility-and-compliance-building-capacity-to-respond-tostakeholder-demands/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“In light of evolving
stakeholder expectations, integrating CSR commitments into a company’s
compliance programs presents opportunities for both enhanced performance and
operational efficiencies.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism
to Consider the Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743, 745
(2009/2010) (“A ‘socially responsible corporation’ may take into consideration the
interests of other stakeholders in the enterprise, including but not limited to
employees, customers, and suppliers.”).
76. See Taylor, supra note 75, at 746 (stating that “the active advancement
of social welfare is, at times, an appropriate and laudable corporate activity”).
77. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (defining CSR).
78. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social
Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1464–
68 (2002) (discussing how proper levels of empathetic corporate governance can
“positively [effect] racial discourse”).
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legal strictures leave off.”79 Compliance with legal strictures and
corporate social responsibility are intertwined in a way that it is
impossible to see where one ends and the other begins.80
Understanding this helps to unravel why many companies install
compliance programs that encourage adherence to the letter of
the law rather than the spirit of the law.
III. Contextualizing: Diversity Discussions vs. Monitoring
Compliance with Antidiscrimination Law
Understanding that there is no clear line of demarcation
between corporate compliance with law and CSR is important in
many business contexts. I will, however, examine only one
context that illustrates how corporate governance decisions are
intertwined with CSR and good citizenship—racial diversity and
antidiscrimination efforts in the business setting. In this context,
several problems manifest. First, there is the seemingly
intractable problem of racially homogenous corporate boards,
workplaces, and executive ranks.81 And, there are other problems
that infect relationships between firms and stakeholders of color:
unfair disparities in pay and promotion rates for employees of
color when compared to white employees;82 profiling consumers of
color when they shop; generally inferior service some consumers

79. Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135.
80. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (arguing that the
distinction between CSR and corporate governance is blurred).
81. See generally, Cheryl L. Wade, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards:
How Racial Politics Impedes Progress in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV.
23 (2014); Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55 (2010); AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM
HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2015).
82. See e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Organizational Responsibility for Workplace
Racial and Sexual Harassment: The Stories of One Company’s Workers, 43
HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 236 (2014) (recounting specific cases against a company
that had engaged in “workplace racial harassment, retaliatory firings, and pay
and promotion discrimination”).
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of color experience;83 and, predatory lending that targets
consumers of color.84
Two problems occur when discussing stakeholders of color in
the business setting. First, emphasis is placed on the race of the
African American and Latino stakeholders who are negatively
impacted by business actors while failing to articulate that the
overwhelming majority of corporate decision-makers are white.85
This way of discussing relationships among white Americans and
Americans of color is prevalent.86 It ignores the fact that
whiteness is a race. I will come back to this later in this Essay
when I discuss corporate personhood.87
Second, most discourse about relationships among Americans
of different races, especially in the business setting, is framed as
a discussion about diversity.88 Diversity sounds like a CSR
issue.89 But a lack of diversity in the business setting is simply a
manifestation of the real problem—implicit, and sometimes even
explicit, bias and discrimination.90 Once the potential for implicit
83. See generally George E. Schrer, Saundra Smith & Kristen Thomas,
“Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a Retail Setting,
39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432 (2009) (providing empirical evidence of
inferior service for African American shoppers).
84. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, How Predatory Mortgage Lending
Changed African American Communities and Families, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 437
(2012) (looking at the effect of predatory lending on African American
communities).
85. See Jillian Berman, Soon, Not Even 1 Percent of Fortune 500
Companies Will Have Black CEOs, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2015 3:41 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/29/black-ceos-fortune500_n_6572074.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“When McDonald’s CEO Don
Thompson officially steps down in March, there will be just four black CEOs in
the Fortune 500.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Race Codes and White
Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L.
REV. 269, 280 (1994) (discussing topics of white race consciousness and the
“white norm” and their effect on applications of the law).
87. See infra notes 190–220 and accompanying text (discussing the racial
identities of corporations, in particular the existence of “white businesses”).
88. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity,
Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 1 (2005) (framing discussion in terms of facilitating diversity).
89. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (defining CSR, including
social issues).
90. See generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin Levinson &
Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (describing implicit stereotyping and bias against
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bias and even explicit discrimination is acknowledged, what is
typically discussed as a CSR issue—a diversity issue—becomes a
corporate governance or compliance issue.91 The question
becomes whether there are effective processes and systems in
place that measure compliance with antidiscrimination law.92
This corporate governance question, unlike a CSR/diversity
question, must be examined because compliance is mandated.93
The voluntary and discretionary nature of CSR drops out of the
picture.94
Here is the problem. Corporate compliance departments
draft and issue policies about harassment and discrimination.95
But, too often, the policy is drafted and put on a shelf.96 This is
inadequate compliance that is also socially irresponsible.
Moreover, “[m]any compliance metrics track activity rather than
impact, thereby demonstrating that compliance may be busy but
not necessarily effective.”97 Though companies might spend
millions on compliance, busy but ineffective programs are a type
of check-the-box corporate governance that is not socially
people of color).
91. See
generally
Sharon
Rabin-Margalioth,
Anti-Discrimination,
Accommodation, and Universal Mandates: Aren’t They All the Same?, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111 (2003) (examining the correlation between
disparate compliance costs and governmental anti-discrimination mandates).
92. See LOUIS M. BROWN, ANNE O. KANDEL & RICHARD S. GRUNER, LEGAL
AUDIT § 8:87 (1990) (evaluating good faith efforts at preventing employment
discrimination).
93. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7202(b) (2012) (making any
violation of the Act enforceable against the violator).
94. See Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135 (“[C]orporate
responsibility concerns can be seen as picking up precisely where legal
strictures leave off.”).
95. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2093 (2016) (“First, authorities uniformly emphasize
the development of policies and procedures for compliance, tailored to the
firm.”).
96. See Lorene D. Park, The Road to Liability is Paved with Inconsistent
Enforcement of Grooming, Tipping, and Other Employment Policies, WOLTERS
KLUWER (Dec. 28, 2013), http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/
2013/12/28/the-road-to-liability-is-paved-with-inconsistent-enforcement-of-groomingtipping-and-many-other-employment-policies/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017)
(demonstrating the frequency of non-enforcement of company policy in multiple
arenas nationwide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
97. Griffith, supra note 95, at 2105–06.
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responsible.98 Compliance programs that transform mere activity
into impact are socially responsible.
IV. Compliance and Fiduciary Duty
It is clear that corporate governance failures can have
significant implications beyond the corporation, its shareholders,
managers and stakeholders.99 Corporate governance failures can
have national and even global impact.100 More specifically,
fiduciary duty breaches and inadequate monitoring of financial
firms’ compliance with law significantly contributed to the 2008
financial crisis.101 Corporate actors must take their obligation to
monitor compliance with law more seriously.102 Boards must
demand installation and implementation of compliance programs
but corporate officers perform the day-to-day work of monitoring
compliance.103
Chief Compliance Officers and the executives, managers, and
employees who work for them are on the front line when it comes
98. See Yanasak & Xenarios, supra note 62 and accompanying text
(evaluating socially irresponsible “check-the-box” compliance approaches and
advocating for improvement); Chatterji & Listokin, supra note 60 and
accompanying text (showing that sometimes even expensive compliance
programs may not be socially responsible).
99. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 48, at 395 (using Enron, WorldCom,
Adelphia, Qwest, Global Crossing and Tyco as preeminent examples of the
reaching effects of failure to comply with corporate and other legal
requirements).
100. See id. (citing examples of significant external effects due to corporate
governance failures).
101. See Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1191, 1197 (2011) (detailing and examining breaches in fiduciary duty
involved in the 2008 financial crisis).
102. See Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight
Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 862–63 (2013)
(asserting that boards must monitor compliance with more fervor in light of the
2008 financial crisis).
103. See generally Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate
Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271 (2014) (describing the importance of
executives and officers in preventing crises by effectively monitoring). See also
Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an
Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 203–06 (2016) (describing differing
positions on whether corporate counsel, rather than corporate executives, should
be responsible for monitoring and compliance).
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to compliance.104 Johnson and Millon’s work about the ambiguity
of the fiduciary duties that officers owe illuminates potential
hazards for them.
For all the renewed federal attention to regulating—and
differentiating—corporate officer and director functions . . . a
curious fact remains: state fiduciary duty law makes no
distinction between the fiduciary duties of these two groups.
Instead, courts and commentators routinely describe the
duties of directors and officers together, and in identical terms.
To lump officers and directors together as generic “fiduciaries”,
with no distinction being made between them suggests—as
patently is not the case—that their institutional function and
legal roles within the corporation are the same. 105

In order to satisfy their fiduciary duties, corporate officers
are responsible for the details of their firms’ compliance
programs.106 A great deal is at stake for the executives and
officers in this regard.107 For example, “officers rightly face a
greater risk of personal liability for misconduct. Heightened
review of officer performance is especially fitting given that many
of the recent corporate scandals involved wrongdoing at the
officer level.”108 In the compliance context, the officers’
misconduct would be one of two things. A grossly negligent
failure to install an adequate compliance program would breach
the duty of care that an officer owes.109 A conscious disregard of
an officer’s obligation to install a compliance program may be

104. See John B. McNeese IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General
Counsel and the Chief Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 683
(2012) (“Staying in compliance requires an active role on the part of the
corporation and by extension, the Chief Compliance Officer.”).
105. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson
& Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries]
106. See id. (stating that officers “daily manage corporate operations” while
directors “remotely monitor corporate affairs”).
107. See id. at 1602 (“[D]irectors must preserve for themselves a critical
governance responsibility on behalf of the corporate principal and its
stockholders . . . .” (emphasis added)).
108. Id. at 1603.
109. The duty of care is breached whenever the decision-making process is
grossly negligent. See generally Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993
(1st Dept. 1976); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985).
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construed as a duty of loyalty breach.110 And, some courts reserve
business judgment rule protection for directors only.111 In these
jurisdictions, corporate officers are far more likely to be found to
have breached fiduciary duties.112
Moreover, many corporate managers may not get the advice
they need from in-house corporate counsel concerning the
fiduciary duties they owe—advice that would help them to
establish effective compliance programs.113 Johnson and Garvis
found that more corporate counsel advise executives about their
fiduciary duties when advising them about compliance and risk
management issues than in other contexts such as transactional
work, employee relations, and executive compensation.114 But not
enough corporate counsel provide advice about fiduciary duty to
officers and managers who are closer to the middle of corporate
hierarchies.115

110. A bad faith failure to monitor compliance with law is established when
fiduciaries consciously disregard their duties or engage in intentional
derelictions of their obligations, thereby violating the duty of loyalty. See
generally Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
111. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 455–65 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson, Business
Judgment] (examining business judgment rule protection as used for directors,
officers generally, or both).
112. See id. (examining effects on officer liability depending on a given
jurisdiction’s treatment of the business judgment rule).
113. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised
About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1113 (2009) (showing how counsel
generally advises executives, with less advisory emphasis on mid-level
managers).
114. See id. (finding that advice regarding fiduciary duties is more frequent
when given to executives about compliance and risk management).
115. See id. at 1117 (“[F]ewer than half of all respondents provide fiduciary
duty advice to managers or officers ‘deeper’ in the organization, such as division
managers or officers of subsidiaries.”); id. at 1120 (“[C]orporate counsel do not
appear to do a particularly good job of advising non-senior officers. . . . This is an
area where advice-giving practices should be improved. It hardly needs arguing
that executive vice presidents, and the whole gamut of more junior-ranking
officers beneath them, have enormous influence over corporate affairs.”). For a
general discussion of fiduciary duties and corporate purpose, see Martin Gelter
& Genevieve Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’
Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069 (2015).
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V. Corporate Personhood and Purpose

In the preceding sections of this Essay, I explore the
possibility of making compliance programs more effective by
challenging companies that claim to be socially responsible while
failing to maintain compliance programs that are effectively
managed and maintained.116 Later in the Essay, I provide context
for the challenge by looking at how certain companies impact
stakeholders of color.117 In this section and the sections that
follow, I examine notions of corporate personhood and purpose,
some of which are offered by Johnson and Millon, in order to
present additional inspiration for corporate managers to take
their compliance obligations more seriously.118
Relatively uncontroversial is the legal fiction that
corporations are entities that are separate from the individuals
who own and manage them.119 There has been some
disagreement, however, about how to describe and define
corporate entities in the context of their separateness.120 The
Supreme Court has refined the notion of corporations as entities
separate from their shareholders, officers, and directors, making
it clear that corporations are persons (at least under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)121 and other federal law) who

116. See supra notes 43–51, 81–98, 101–115 and accompanying text
(discussing the overlapping principles guiding CSR and corporate governance,
viewing this overlap in the context of anti-discrimination and harassment
compliance regimes, and incorporating this understanding with the doctrine of
fiduciary duty).
117. See infra notes 190–234 and accompanying text (looking at the effect
companies can have on stakeholders of color by considering the racial
characteristics of these companies).
118. See infra notes 152–200 and accompanying text (examining notions of
corporate personhood and purpose, including such characteristics as a
company’s race and religion).
119. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“Generally, a corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate from its
shareholders and officers.”).
120. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1
(highlighting throughout the article points of contention that still exist after the
Hobby Lobby decision).
121. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2012).
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are separate from the flesh and blood people who invest in them
and act on their behalf.122
In their Article, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,123
Johnson and Millon sort through some of the most frequently
debated issues relating to corporate law and corporate
governance in the aftermath of the controversial 2014 Supreme
Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.124 The Supreme
Court held that for-profit corporations, because they are
“persons” under RFRA, have a federally protected right to
exercise religion.125 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp., the closely held for-profit companies at
issue in the consolidated cases, argued that the contraceptive
mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”)126 was a substantial burden on the religious freedom of
the corporations.127
The Court held that the companies, Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga, did not have to comply with the ACA’s contraceptive
mandate because compliance would hamper the companies’ free
exercise of religion.128 Arguably, the Court protected the
free-exercise rights of closely held corporations by attributing to
the corporations the religious beliefs of their Christian
shareholders.129 The Court acknowledged that its protection of a
122. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014)
(“[T]he wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
(citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
123. See Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 2–3
(discussing the most debated issues arising from the Hobby Lobby decision).
124. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
125. See id. at 2771 (affirming the right of for-profit corporations to pursue
any lawful act or purpose, “including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the
owners' religious principles.”).
126. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 114-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
127. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“ . . . [T]he mandate clearly
imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.”).
128. See id. at 2771 (explaining that for-profit organizations may not be
presumed to be solely concerned with the pursuit of money).
129. See id. at 2768 (“An established body of law specifies the rights and
obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who
are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to
protect the rights of these people.”).
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closely held for-profit corporation’s free-exercise rights was
imperative in order to protect the religious freedom of the flesh
and blood individuals who control and own the corporations.130
By answering the question of whether a for-profit corporation
is a person under RFRA in the affirmative, the Court confirmed
the idea of corporate personhood when it decided the Hobby
Lobby case.131 Businesspeople, corporate lawyers and scholars,
along with judges who decide business law cases, long ago
embraced the notion that corporations are entities separate from
the humans who own and control them.132 But, knowing that
corporations are separate from officers, shareholders and
directors does little to clarify the kinds of entities corporations
are.133
Professor Kent Greenfield noted “the increased political focus
on corporate personhood” after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,134 in which the
Court protected the First Amendment rights of corporations to
make political expenditures aimed at influencing election
outcomes.135 When Mitt Romney campaigned in 2012, he
proclaimed that “corporations are people.”136 But, Greenfield
noted that some notable lawyers, who are politicians also,
rejected the legal fiction of corporate personhood.137 President

130. See id. at 2786 (“RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of an agency
such as HHS on distinguishing between different religious believers—burdening
one while accommodating the other—when it may treat both equally by offering
both of them the same accommodation.”).
131. See id. at 2768 (Interpreting the RFRA’s use of the term “person” by
looking to the Dictionary Act, affirming that a corporation is “person” under the
RFRA (citing Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
132. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“Generally, a corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate from its
shareholders and officers.”).
133. See infra notes 152–200 and accompanying text (examining various
kinds of corporate identities).
134. See 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affirming and protecting the right of a
nonprofit corporation to political speech).
135. Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT.
309, 310 (2015).
136. Id.
137. See id. (quoting President Barack Obama and Senator Elizabeth
Warren, whose stances reject the legal fiction of corporate personhood).
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Obama declared that “people are people.”138 Senator Elizabeth
Warren made several speeches in which she summarily rejected
the idea that corporations are persons.139 Greenfield described
other individuals and organizations that formed what he calls the
“anti-personhood movement.”140 According to Greenfield,
however, corporate personhood is an analytically important
foundational principle that should require “courts to separate the
claims of shareholders from those of the corporation itself,
leading to a dismissal of corporate religious claims asserted on
behalf of shareholders.”141
Several corporate and criminal law professors, including
Professor Greenfield, filed an amicus brief exploring the impact
on corporate law of Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga’s arguments
that the religious beliefs of the companies’ shareholders should be
attributed to the corporations.142 Their argument did not revolve
around corporate personhood but pertained to the related notion
of the corporation’s separateness.143 They asserted that
attributing the religious beliefs of shareholders to the corporation
in which they invested (whether the investment is direct or
indirect) ignored the legal fiction of the separateness of the
corporation from its owners.144 The legal fiction that corporations
are entities separate from those who own and manage them
justifies the most salient characteristic of all corporations—

138. Id.
139. See id. (“According to the Washington Post, her most dependable
applause line in her stump speech was “Corporations are not people!”).
140. See id. at 310–11 (referencing groups such as Common Cause, Public
Citizen, and Free Speech for the People as members of the “anti-personhood
movement”).
141. Id. at 312.
142. I signed onto an amicus brief drafted by Jayne Barnard, Barbara Black,
James Cox, Kent Greenfield, Ellen Podgor, and Faith Stevelman that makes
this point. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in
Support of Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014), (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333889 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief].
143. See generally id.
144. See id. at 2 (“The essence of a corporation is its ‘separateness’ from its
shareholders. It is a distinct legal entity, with its own rights and obligations,
different from the rights and obligations of its shareholders. This Court has
repeatedly recognized this separateness.”).

1210

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1187 (2017)

limited liability.145 But for this separateness, according to the
amicus signatories, individual shareholders would be personally
responsible for the corporation’s tort or contract debts.146
As we all now know, the Court disagreed with the arguments
made in the amicus brief, and the Christian faith practiced by the
shareholders of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga was the religion that
the companies had a right to freely exercise.147 The Court
protected the religious freedom of the corporations by referring to
the religious beliefs of their owners.148 Johnson and Millon, in
their article Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, explain away the
concerns of the corporate and criminal law professors who filed
the amicus brief.149 They point out that the separateness of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga from their shareholders was
preserved because the religious beliefs and practices of the
individual shareholders are relevant only in their roles as
corporate actors.150 The article notes, “[a]nalytically, in order to
preserve the separateness of the corporation as a legal person
distinct in a meaningful way from the humans associated with it,
145. When shareholders fail to respect the separation between themselves
and the corporations in which they invest, courts may pierce the corporate veil
that protects shareholders with limited liability and the shareholders may be
held personally liable to tort and contract creditors. See Walkovszky v. Carlton,
244 N.E.2d 55, 55 (N.Y. 1968) (affirming a denial to dismiss case against
shareholder defendant because complaint alleged sufficient facts to pierce the
corporate veil); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 524–25 (7th
Cir. 1991) (determining that the two-pronged state law test for piercing the
corporate veil was not satisfied).
146. See Amicus Brief, supra note 142, at 2 (“Shareholders rely on the
corporation's separate existence to shield them from personal liability. When
they voluntarily choose to incorporate a business, shareholders cannot then
decide to ignore, either directly or indirectly, the distinct legal existence of the
corporation when it serves their personal interests.”).
147. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014)
(affirming the lower court judgment that the contraceptive mandate violated
RFRA).
148. See id. at 2768 (“Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”).
149. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 16
(elaborating on the Court’s equating of individual rights with the rights of a
corporation run by those individuals).
150. Id. at 16 (“Roles, organizational structure, and the decisionmaking
process are all quite different for humans interacting in the corporate setting
than outside it. But the human desire to express religious convictions in the
corporate milieu may be no less fervent . . . .”).
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while still acknowledging their desires for religious expression,
the Court emphasized . . . the corporate capacity and corporate
positions and roles played by these humans.”151
VI. If Corporations Are Persons, What Kinds of Persons Are They?
Corporations are persons that are separate from the humans
who own and control them.152 But what kinds of persons are they?
In the aftermath of the Court’s embrace of and elaboration on
some aspects of corporate personhood in Hobby Lobby153 and
Citizens United,154 it is important to dig deep and think about
other aspects of a corporation’s identity. That is what I do in this
Part of my Essay, but I do not do so to bestow on corporations
even more rights. I examine other aspects of a corporation’s
identity and personhood, specifically a corporation’s race, because
doing so reveals nontrivial implications for corporate governance
and social responsibility.155
Besides the right to freely exercise religion, and their right
to free speech in the form of political contributions, what else, or
who else, are corporations? Once we accept the idea that
corporations are persons who are separate from the flesh and
blood individuals who own and manage them, it is imperative to
examine the kinds of persons corporations are.156 Already crystal
clear are the characteristics of a corporation as an artificial
entity—limited liability, free transferability of shares, centralized
151. Id.
152. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“Generally, a corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate from its
shareholders and officers.”).
153. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
154. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
155. See infra notes 157–203, 221–234 and accompanying text (examining
aspects of corporate identity and personhood for their impact on corporate
governance and social responsibility).
156. For one example exploring this question, see Teemu Ruskola, What is a
Corporation? Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of Enterprise
Organization and State, Family, and Personhood, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 639, 640
(2014) (“An easy, but not very informative, answer is that [a corporation] is . . . a
legal person . . . . More substantive answers suggest that it is a moral person, a
person/thing, a production team, a nexus of private agreements, a city, a
semi-sovereign, a (secular) God, or a penguin (kind of).”).
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management, and continuity of life.157 But we need to know more
about the identity and characteristics of the corporate person.
This knowledge has important implications that relate to
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.158 One
way to begin this inquiry is to think about how we describe and
think about flesh and blood people in the United States (U.S.).
Descriptions of individuals in the U.S. frequently rely on one
or more of several components of identity: religion; race; gender;
age; national origin; ethnicity; sexual orientation; class; physical
ability or disability; and political affiliation, among other
things.159 Since corporations are persons, it makes sense to ask in
what ways the factors that make up an individual’s identity apply
to define and describe the identity of a corporation.
First, consider two of the factors from the list in the
preceding paragraph. Flesh and blood people frequently have a
religious and a political affiliation accompanied by First
Amendment rights related to these affiliations.160 In some sense,
so do corporate persons.161 In Hobby Lobby, the U.S. Supreme
Court protected the free exercise of religion rights of two closely
held corporations.162 In Citizens United, the Court protected a
157. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 89 (1991) (“The so-called ‘Kintner regulations,’
which govern on this issue, identify four characteristics that distinguish
corporations and partnerships: continuity of life, centralized management, free
transferability of interest, and limited liability.”).
158. See infra notes 163–178, 212–234 and accompanying text (dealing with
the elements of corporate personhood—including religion and race—and their
effect on corporate governance and CSR).
159. See, e.g., U.N.C.—GILLINGS SCH. GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH, HOW WOULD
YOU DEFINE DIVERSITY? 1 (2010), https://sph.unc.edu/files/2013/07/define
_diversity.pdf (“Differences among groups of people and individuals based on
ethnicity, race, socioeconomic status, gender, exceptionalities, language,
religion, sexual orientation, and geographical area.”).
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
161. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(affirming the right of religious expression for the corporations); Citizens United
v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affirming the right to make political
contributions for the corporation).
162. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (allowing closely-held for-profit
corporations the right to religious expression).
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corporation’s right to make political expenditures aimed at
assisting political campaigns.163 So we can say, in some rough
sense, that corporations (at least those that are closely held) may
be identified as having religious rights that they can freely
exercise according to the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby, and
they also have political affiliations in line with the court’s
analysis in Citizens United.164
Two other factors used when describing individuals—age and
national origin—are far less controversial when used to describe
corporate persons.165 Some corporations are young, recently
incorporated startups, others are venerable firms that have been
incorporated for decades.166 The corporation’s national origin is
easily defined by looking to the country in which it
incorporated.167 The analogue to the physical ability of natural
persons in the corporate context is to ask whether the company is
performing well.168 Or, is it “disabled” by debt, approaching
163. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 313
(allowing nonprofit corporation the right to make political contributions by
affirming its right to political speech).
164. See id. (identifying a corporation as having political affiliations); Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (discussing corporations and their ability to have
religious affiliations).
165. See How Would You Define Diversity?, supra note 159 (including age
and national origin in definitions of diversity).
166. Compare Biz Carson, Top 17 Startups to Launch So Far in 2016, BUS.
INSIDER (June 28, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/top-17startups-launched-in-2016-2016-6 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing
examples of “young” companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review), with Founded When? America’s Oldest Companies, BUS. NEWS DAILY
(July 29, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/8122-oldestcompanies-in-america.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing examples of
“old” companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
167. See Richard R. W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2023, 2082 (2006) (“When corporations were largely held by local interests, all
possessing the same state or national citizenship, the matter of transferring
shareholder citizenship to the corporation was somewhat straightforward.”). For
a list of examples of foreign corporations and the countries in which they are
incorporated, see Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission December 31, 2000, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (Dec. 31, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/
alpha2000.htm (last updated June 25, 2002) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. See
Margaret
Rouse,
Corporate
Performance,
WHATIS.COM,
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/corporate-performance (last updated Oct.
2015) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“Corporate performance analysis is a subset of
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insolvency or even bankruptcy? The class question is slightly
more challenging conceptually. For natural persons, class is
determined by an individual’s wealth, education, social status
and income.169 Similarly, “class” differences among corporations
can be examined by looking at a company’s wealth—its assets, for
example, and its income—more typically referred to as
earnings.170
Determining a corporation’s gender, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation is more problematic analytically but not impossible. A
closely held company whose shareholders, officers, and directors
are women or heterosexual may be a female corporation or a
heterosexual corporation as determined by the identities of its
shareholders.171 The ethnicity of a closely held corporation may be
determined by its shareholders when all or most of them are, for
example, Italian-American.172 The Supreme Court’s approach in
Hobby Lobby was similar.173 The religious rights of the
corporation derived from the religious affiliations of Hobby
Lobby’s owners.174 Arguably, it is possible to label Hobby Lobby
as a Christian company because its shareholders are Christian.175
business analytics/business intelligence . . . that is concerned with the ‘health’ of
the organization, which has traditionally been measured in terms of financial
performance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See Milton M. Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology, 55 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 262, 262 (1949) (“The term ‘social class’ . . . is used by sociologists to
refer to the horizontal stratification of a population.”).
170. See Wealth, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/
wealth.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“Wealth measures the value of all the
assets of worth owned by a . . . company . . . . Wealth is determined by taking
the total value of all physical and intangible assets owned, then subtracting all
debts. Essentially, wealth is the accumulation of resources.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
171. See Brooks, supra note 167, at 2082 (mentioning gender as an element
of corporate identity based on the shareholders).
172. See id. at 2072 (discussing the ethnicity of corporations based on the
general ethnic identity of the shareholders, though ethnicity of corporations has
also been found by looking to the conduct of third party consumers).
173. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(equating the religious beliefs of the shareholders with the religious affiliation of
the corporation).
174. See id. at 2768 (“Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”).
175. See id. (making consistent reference to the religion of the Hobby Lobby
shareholders in order to determine that Hobby Lobby had a protected right to
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The same reasoning works in determining the race of a
corporation. The idea that a corporation has a race, however, is
not new or peculiar.176 While we rarely think of corporate entities
as female, heterosexual, ethnic, Christian, or Republican,
corporations have been racialized.177 For example, “courts have
declared that corporations can and do possess racial identities ‘as
a matter of law.’”178
Also, consider that from June 1 through 7, 2016, the first
“Virtual Black Business Week,” took place.179 There is also a
“Black Business Directory,”180 a “Black Business Association,181 a
“National Black Business Month,”182 and even a Black Business
School.183 Note that these events and organizations do not refer to
a business week, directory, association or school for “black owned”
businesses, or for black entrepreneurs.184 They refer to “black
religious expression).
176. See Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d
1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that, in the present case, “a corporation has
acquired an imputed racial identity”).
177. See Bains, LLC v. Arco Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005)
(imputing racial identity to the corporation).
178. Brooks, supra note 167, at 2025 (“[C]ourts have declared that
corporations can and do possess racial identities ‘as a matter of law.’” (citing
Thinket, 368 F.3d at 1059)). Brooks also cited to Pourier v. S.D. Dep’t of
Revenue. 658 N.W.2d 395, 404 (finding that corporation had enrolled as a
member of an Indigenous American ethnic group).
179. See
NEW
YORK
BLACK
ENTREPRENEURS
NETWORK,
http://www.meetup.com/NewYorkBlackEntrepreneursNetwork/events/22066889
2/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing information on upcoming events and for
those interested in the network) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
180. See BLACKBUSINESSLIST.COM, http://www.blackbusinesslist.com/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to support, advertise, or search for black
businesses) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See BLACK BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, http://www.bbala.org/ (last visited
Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to bids, jobs, events, news, and other member
information) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
182. See BLACKBUSINESSMONTH.COM, http://blackbusinessmonth.com/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links in a timeline highlighting notable news in
the black business community) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
183. See THE BLACK BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://theblackbusinessschool.com/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing information for enrolling in the school and
the featured programs in the curriculum) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
184. See supra notes 179–183 (choosing to explicitly describe and attribute
race to the organizations’ identity).
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business.”185 There are also Hispanic Business Associations186
and a National Hispanic Business Group.187 And, there is an
Asian American Business Association188 and an Asian American
Business Roundtable.189
The fact that there are categories labeled “black business,”190
“Hispanic business,”191 and Asian American business192 not only
illustrates the racialization of business and firms, but also begs
the question of whether there is such a thing as “white
business.”193 There do not seem to be any white business schools,
national white business months, white business associations or
directories.194 But the fact that there are no explicitly labeled
185. See supra notes 179–183 (referring to the businesses as “black” rather
than describing the business in reference to its black members).
186. See,
e.g.,
ROCHESTER
HISPANIC
BUSINESS
ASSOCIATION,
http://rochesterhba.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to bids, jobs,
events, news, and other member information) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also HISPANIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://www.cbshba.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing
links and general information for members, recruiters, prospective students) (on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. See NATIONAL HISPANIC BUSINESS GROUP, http://www.nhbg.org/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to events, funding, and other member
information) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
188. See
ASIAN
AMERICAN
BUSINESS
EXPO,
http://asianamerican
businessexpo.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links for the event
program, registration, membership, and sponsorship opportunities) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
189. See
ASIAN
AMERICAN
BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE,
http://aabusinessroundtable.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing
information on the forum, the AABR generally, upcoming summits, speaker
information, and registration) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
190. See supra notes 179–183 (illustrating groups organizing around the
concept of “black business”).
191. See supra notes 186–187 (noting groups organizing around the concept
of “Hispanic business”).
192. See supra notes 188–189 (identifying groups organizing themselves
around the concept of Asia American business).
193. See Alicia M. Robb & Robert W. Fairlie, Access to Financial Capital
Among U.S. Businesses: The Case of African American Firms, 613 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 47, 48–49 (2007) (discussing the negative impact of
limited access to financial capital on African American businesses).
194. See generally ALICIA M. ROBB & ROBERT W. FAIRLIE, RACE AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS: BLACK-, ASIAN-, AND WHITE-OWNED BUSINESSES IN
THE UNITED STATES (2008) (referring to “white-owned” businesses rather than
describing business identities as “white”).
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white business schools, directories, organizations, or events, does
not mean that they do not exist.195 We just do not speak of them
in that way. To do so would be deemed by some as racist.196
If there are in fact black, Asian American, and Latino
businesses, it would seem that the rest of U.S. businesses are
white.197 The fact that they are not labeled white is irrelevant.198
They exist. They are companies where the overwhelming
majority, if not all, board members, executives, or senior
managers are white.199 Corporate persons belong to socially
constructed racial groups in ways that are similar to the
assignation of race to flesh and blood persons.200 Acknowledging
and understanding this will help corporate officers and managers
navigate their relationships with stakeholders of color.201
In examining the utility of racializing the corporate person,202
it is important to understand what race is.203 Critical legal
195. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982)
(directly identifying the existence of “white businesses”).
196. See The Racial Equity Resource Guide, W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION,
http://www.racialequityresourceguide.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(identifying certain networks and programs aimed at building anti-racist
coalitions against “white” organizations) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
197. See supra notes 179–189 (providing examples of black, Hispanic, and
Asian American “business” groups).
198. See supra note 194 (labeling businesses as white-owned rather than
truly being white businesses).
199. White-owned businesses that are run exclusively by white management
embody a “white business” identity even if they are not described, by themselves
and others, as such. See supra note 194, at 1 (discussing the disparities between
businesses owned by individuals of different races).
200. See Bernie D. Jones, Fathers of Conscience: Mixed-Race Inheritance in
the Antebellum South, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 395, 395 (2010) (noting that
“[c]ategorical assignations of race and status fail to encompass a lateral
diversity to include free, wealthy, and propertied blacks”).
201. See Sloan T. Letman & Katherine Leslie, Disproportionate Minority
Confinement, 2004 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 57, 70 (utilizing advisory groups
including “stakeholders of color” to effectively respond to community problems,
which is a tactic for corporate relations with stakeholders of color as well).
202. See John A. Powell & Caitlin Watt, Corporate Prerogative, Race, and
Identity under the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 885, 899 (2010)
(discussing the racialization of the corporate person) (citing Steve Martinot, The
Cultural Roots of Interventionism in the United States, 30 SOC. JUST. 1, 126
(2003)).
203. See Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986)
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scholars explain that race is a social construct.204 Ian F. Haney
Lopez explained that, “human interaction rather than natural
differentiation must be seen as the source and continued basis for
racial categorization.”205 He also noted that, “races are construed
relationally, against one another, rather than in isolation.”206
Another commenter observed that “[p]ersons of different
races have distinguishing physical characteristics. These physical
characteristics, such as phenotype, are, however, not biologically
determinative of personality, traits, intelligence, or other
important personal characteristics.207 In fact, the biological
difference is unimportant, but society has constructed important
differences.”208 Race is a social construction, but it is “materially
relevant.”209
Psychologists observe that the assignation of race to
individuals in the U.S. is inevitable.210 Phenotype and other
(noting the difficulty some courts have faced in defining what race is).
204. See supra notes 205–219 (describing various interpretations of race as a
social construct and its effects on the corporate person).
205. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
27 (1994) (arguing for viewing race as a social construction).
206. See id. at 28 (discussing the “four important facets of the social
construction of race”).
207. See Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW.
L.J. 221, 241 (2015) (discussing critical race theory and race as a social
construction); see also Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609
(1987) (finding that only in the twentieth century did dictionaries refer to “race
as involving divisions of mankind based upon different physical
characteristics”).
208. See id. at 241 (noting that “history and its social effects” created race).
209. See id. (arguing that it is “materially relevant” because “blackness” and
its association with stereotypes and prejudices affect society, institutions, and
the individuals within them).
210.
Race essentializes and stereotypes people, their social statuses, their
social behaviors and their social ranking. In the Unites States and
South Africa, one cannot escape the process of racialization; it is a
basic element of the social system and customs of the United States
and is deeply embedded in the consciousness of its people. Physical
traits have been transformed into markers or signifiers of social
racial identity. But the flexibility of racial ideology is such that
distinctive physical traits need no longer be present for humans to
racialize others.
Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a
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physical attributes are less relevant than the cultural meanings
that attach to an individual’s race.211 The notion of corporate
personhood invites the same type of racialization of firms that
occurs with individuals, but this racialization does not depend on
physical characteristics.212 I posit that it does not even depend on
a physical body, thereby making a corporation’s racialization less
implausible. In other words, the corporation has no physical body
but it can still have a race.213
I acknowledge, however, that racializing corporations may
unfairly advantage or disadvantage corporations depending on
the race attributed to them.214 The race of flesh and blood persons
“continues to play an important role in determining how
individuals are treated . . . their employment opportunities . . .
and whether individuals can fully participate in the social,
political, and economic mainstream of American life.”215 The same
thing can happen when considering the race of a corporation.216
Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the
Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16, 22 (2005).
211.
Skin color, hair texture, nose width, and lip thickness have remained
major markers of racial identity in the United States. . . . However,
physical features and differences connoted by them are not the
effective or direct causes of racism and discrimination. It is the
culturally invented ideas and beliefs about these differences that
constitute the meaning of race.
Id. at 20.
212. See Vinay Harpalani, DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of
South Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 77, 170 (2013) (referencing
the idea that “[b]y making race—taking an active part in the process if
racialization—individuals stake out new racial meanings”); see also STEVE
MARTINOT, THE RULE OF RACIALIZATION: CLASS, IDENTITY, GOVERNANCE 75 (2003)
(noting that physical characteristics serve as signifiers and play a role in
racialization).
213. See Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1288 n.165 (1991) (describing how the Supreme Court
implicitly “recognized that corporations can have a race”).
214. See supra note 211, at 16, 23 (finding that public policy cannot ignore
race).
215. Id. at 23. See also Paul Gowder, Symposium: Critical Race Theory and
Empirical Methods Conference: Critical Race Science and Critical Race
Philosophy of Science, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3155, 3157 (2015) (“When
we . . . observe the race of others, that observation is not a neutral act.”).
216. See supra note 207 (describing how one’s race affects their social and
economic status as individuals, but without precluding that description for the
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Attributing race to a place or thing other than an individual
is not new.217 Scholars have written about racialized spaces—
white neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and restaurants, for
example.218 These “white spaces” contrast with what many
Americans stereotypically construe as “black spaces.” The ghetto
as a black space is one example.219 This phenomena, “[t]he
‘racialization of space,’ . . . is the process by which residential
location and community are carried and placed on racial
identity.”220
John Calmore noted that “legal persons adopt and are
ascribed identities for the same reasons as natural persons:
Identities signify commitments of persons to other persons,
communities, beliefs, and conventions.”221 When a company
acknowledges its racial identity, it has the capacity to understand
more clearly certain governance issues.222 To which stakeholders
is the corporation committed? What is the company’s relationship
with stakeholders of color? If this relationship is not optimal,
acknowledging a company’s racial identity may reveal implicit
biases and perhaps even previously ignored intentional
discrimination.223 A focus on a corporation’s race can inform a
company’s compliance with anti-discrimination law—an
important corporate governance matter.224 And, when business
race of corporations as well).
217. See supra notes 205–212 (noting examples of attributing race to
something other than an individual).
218. See Elijah Anderson, The White Space, in SOCIOLOGY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY 10, 10 (2015) (noting the clear differences between “white” and
“black” spaces).
219. Id.
220. See John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
“Hewing a Stone of Home From a Mountain of Despair”, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233,
1235 (1995) (defining the “racialization of space” concept).
221. Id. at 2026.
222. See Powell & Watt, supra note 202, at 897 (recognizing that the
“deliberate creation of a space for both a new kind of racial identity and a new
kind of citizen that would implicate the role and identity with the elite and
corporate America”).
223. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through
Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 926 (2016) (noting the use of
“implicit bias to broaden the concept of intentional discrimination” when
challenging “subtle discrimination”).
224. See Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship
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leaders no longer ignore their firm’s racial identity, their firms’
relationships with stakeholders of color may improve.225 When
corporate leaders understand racial differences between their
firms and the firms’ stakeholders, implicit biases that
disadvantage certain stakeholders may become more
discoverable.226 The impact of better relationships with
stakeholders of color can have at least modestly transformative
consequences for American society in general.227 The ubiquity and
influence of corporations in U.S. culture may mean that more
equitable corporate cultures will positively influence racial reality
in the U.S.228
Understanding a firm’s racial identity has potentially
positive implications that may make the company more socially
responsible.229 Take for example the corporation that has hired
Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 389, 389–90 (2002) (stating that breaches of antidiscrimination monitoring
compliance can seriously harm the economic interests of shareholders in the
short term and may also affect the long term profitability of the corporation and
shareholders).
225. See id. at 440 (suggesting “ways to help corporate managers serve
shareholders” and other stakeholders “while adhering to . . . the laws
prohibiting racial discrimination”).
226. See Elayne E. Greenberg, Fitting the Forum to the Pernicious Fuss: A
Dispute System Design to Address Implicit Bias and ‘Isms in the Workplace, 17
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 75, 76 (2015) (finding that “although overt
expressions of bias have significantly decreased in recent years, expressions of
implicit bias, the primary cause of workplace discrimination, persist”).
227. See Jeff Nesbit, America Has a Big Race Problem, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.
(March
28,
2016),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-0328/america-has-a-big-race-problem (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (finding that
there is a need for younger generations misperceptions about a “post-racial
society” in the corporate world to change) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
228. See LEADERSHIP LEARNING CMTY., LEADERSHIP & RACE 10 (2010),
http://leadershiplearning.org/system/files/Leadership%20and%20Race%20FINA
L_Electronic_072010.pdf (discussing whether current approaches contribute to
“growing disparities” or supporting “a more equitable and just future for people
of all races and ethnicities”).
229. See RONDA L. WHITE, THE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
ENDORSEMENT WITH RACE-RELATED EXPERIENCES, RACIAL ATTITUDES, AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES AMONG BLACK COLLEGE STUDENTS ii, xiv (2008)
(noting that these findings suggest that endorsement of social responsibility
attitudes differs from actual engagement in the behaviors consistent with social
responsibility) (on file with the DeepBlue Collection at the University of
Michigan).
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few people of color. If that firm’s managers acknowledge the
firm’s race as white, they may become more cognizant of the
impact of racial differences between the firm and its decision
makers on the one hand, and the people of color interviewed on
the other.230 Or, if most of the interviewees are white, and if most
are hired to the exclusion of candidates of color, the shared racial
identity of the white firm and the white hires may inspire
meaningful introspection about hiring practices.231
Attributing racial identity to a corporation may shed light on
the pervasive, entrenched ways race and racism impact a
company’s relationship with stakeholders of color, its culture, and
its social standing.232 Lawyers, academics, judges, and
businesspeople rarely talk about race in the context of corporate
law and governance.233 The fact that little to nothing is said about
race in the corporate context, however, does not render race,
racism, and racial difference unimportant or nonexistent.
Scholars have noted that, “[r]ace suffuses all bodies of
law . . . even ‘the purest corporate law questions within the most
unquestionably Anglo scholarly paradigm.’”234
230. See Dr. Arin N. Reeves, Colored by Race: Bias in the Evaluation of
Candidates of Color by Law Firm Hiring Committees, MINORITY CORP. COUNSEL
ASS’N
(2006),
http://www.mcca.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&
pageid=576 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing “strategies law firms should
employ to address the challenges they face in creating and implementing an
objective hiring process where differences are valued instead of tolerated and
diversity is appreciated instead of exploited”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
231. See id. (outlining specific hiring processes that “acknowledge the
realities of racial bias” which “cannot be removed unless” it is acknowledged).
232. See CHARLES T. BANNER-HALEY, THE FRUITS OF INTEGRATION: BLACK
MIDDLE-CLASS IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE, 1960–1990, 161 (2010) (noting that
African Americans continued “to face a corporate culture entrenched in racist
notions” about African Americans).
233. See Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and
Race Discrimination, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1461, 1461–62 (2002) (finding that
books on corporate governance are silent on race issues and citing Jay W. Lorsch
& Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or Potentates (1989) and Robert A.G. Monks & Nell
Minow, Corporate Governance (2d ed. 2001) as examples of this idea).
234. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
44 (1994) (discussing the idea that “no body of law exists untainted by the
powerful astringent of race in our society”) (citing Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural
Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705,
729 and Mario L. Baeza, Telecommunications Reregulation and Deregulation:
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VII. Johnson and Millon on Hobby Lobby: Shareholder Primacy,
Stakeholders, and Corporate Social Responsibility
The Court in Hobby Lobby makes clear that a corporation’s
role and purpose is not limited to shareholder wealth
maximization.235 Under state law, the Court explains, for-profit
corporations may be formed to pursue any lawful purpose their
organizers desire.236 Corporations may pursue profit, for example,
“in conformity with the owners’ religious principles.”237 The Court
acknowledges that the goal of for-profit corporations is to “pursue
profit” but they do not have to do so “at the expense of everything
else.”238 Offering two examples, the Court explains that many
for-profit corporations behave charitably and altruistically.239
Some firms protect the environment in ways that go beyond what
is required by law.240 Other companies may operate in ways that
protect workers’ interests beyond “the requirements of local law
regarding working conditions and benefits.”241
The Court’s language, perhaps unwittingly, suggests
important analytical distinctions among the notions of corporate
compliance,
stakeholder
theory,
and
corporate
social

The Impact on Opportunities for Minorities, 2 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 7 (1985)
(discussing the pervasive impact of race on society)).
235. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(noting that modern corporate law may not require corporations to “pursue
profit at the expense of everything else”).
236. Id. at 2771.
237. See id. at 2770–71 (finding that state law, which governs the “objectives
that may” be pursued by companies, permits religious principles to guide profit
pursuits for the companies at issue in the case).
238. See id. at 2771 (permitting invocation of religious principles for
company goals and objectives).
239. See id. (illustrating through examples of a “for-profit corporation
[taking] costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go
beyond what the law requires” and “a for-profit corporation that operates
facilities in other countries [that] may exceed the requirements of local law
regarding working conditions and benefits”).
240. See id. (using a hypothetical example to show that U.S. companies may
unilaterally behave altruistically when they provide advantages and benefits
beyond what is required overseas, and thus, not succumbing to the low-hanging
profitable fruit of engaging in inhumane, but legal working conditions abroad).
241. See id. (describing how there is no reason religious objectives may not
be pursued).
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responsibility.242 That corporate boards and officers should install
monitoring systems that produce information about their firms’
compliance with applicable law is a foundational corporate
governance principle.243 The Court introduces this idea by
referring to what the law requires companies to do to protect the
environment or workers.244
Then, the Court acknowledges that state corporate
statutes permit for-profit companies to go beyond what the law
requires in environmental regulation and labor law. 245 This
going beyond what the law requires can be construed as the
application of stakeholder theory.246 This is the idea that, in
their decision-making, boards may consider the interests of any
constituency that has a stake in the company—employees,
creditors, consumers, and the communities in which the
company does business. 247 So, corporate boards can do more
than what the law requires for the benefit of the company’s
stakeholders. 248 For example, as the Court states in Hobby
242. See id. (leaving open the implications of corporations adopting
charitable or altruistic objectives).
243. See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971
(Del. Ch. 1996) (describing failure to monitor as “director inattention or
‘negligence’”).
244. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(noting how both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma law permit pursuit of profits “in
conformance with the owners’ religious principles”).
245. See id. (noting how both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma law permit
pursuit of profits “in conformance with the owners’ religious principles”).
246. See Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical
Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193,
201 (2005) (describing stakeholder theory as embodying “the idea that the
corporation is an entity that has profound effects on society. On that basis, those
affected should have some influence or control over the corporation”).
247. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, And Implications, 20 ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 65,
82 (1995), http://faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholdertheoryofcorporation.
pdf (noting that the “modern corporation by its nature creates interdependencies
with a variety of groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern,
such as employees, customers, suppliers and members of the communities in
which the corporation operates”).
248. See Noah Noked, The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and
Effective Stakeholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Dec. 28, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/28/thecorporate-social-responsibility-report-and-effective-stakeholder-engagement/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (concluding that “it would benefit companies to effectively
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Lobby, boards can adopt “costly pollution-control . . . measures
that go beyond what the law requires.” 249 These
pollution-control measures protect corporate stakeholders,
namely, local communities. 250 The Court also acknowledges
that state law allows many for-profit companies to operate
“facilities in other countries [that] may exceed the
requirements of local law regarding working conditions and
benefits.”251 Once again, this is relevant to stakeholder
theory.252 Some companies protect stakeholders, i.e. workers, in
other countries even when not required to do so under domestic
and foreign law. 253
But the Court seems to go beyond stakeholder theory when
it mentions that there is nothing in state corporation statutes
precluding charitable, humanitarian, and altruistic goals. 254
The Court points out that some corporations adopt
“energy-conservation measures” that are not required by
law.255 Conserving energy is a practice that goes beyond the
interests of a company’s stakeholders. 256 It benefits national
engage their shareholders, and other stakeholders as necessary . . . so that
(1) related stakeholder concerns can be proactively discussed and
addressed . . . [and] (3) relationships between companies and their stakeholders
may be nurtured.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
249. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (comparing pursuit of religious
objectives with pollution-control and energy-conservation measures).
250. See id. at 2771 (implying that these environmental concerns constitute
“worthy objectives” precisely because they protect local communities as
corporate stakeholders).
251. See id. (noting other objectives that are as worthy and permissible as
pursuing religious objectives).
252. See Sheehy, supra note 246 (noting a corporation’s fundamental
tendency to affect society).
253. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(referencing the example of a company adhering to working conditions and
benefits in excess of those required by the law to protect stakeholder-workers).
254. See id. (finding that Pennsylvania and Oklahoma laws permit for-profit
corporations to pursue “any lawful purpose” or “act,” including the pursuit of
profit in conformity with the owners’ religious principles and that corporate
discretion in this regard is broad).
255. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (using the example of
corporations pursuing far-reaching environmental objectives to illustrate
permissible, worthy objectives for corporations beyond sheer profit
maximization).
256. See supra note 250 (recognizing energy and pollution-conservation
measures as benefitting company stakeholders in the form of local
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and
global
communities. 257
It
is
corporate
social
258
responsibility.
This part of the Court’s analysis in Hobby Lobby can assist
corporate leaders in managing their firms’ anti-discrimination
efforts and articulated diversity goals.259 When it comes to
compliance with anti-discrimination law, business leaders must
be clear about what the law requires, and they must be clear and
honest about explicit and implicit biases at their firms.260 In this
regard, the assignation of race to a corporation, discussed earlier
in this Essay, is helpful.261 Many, if not most, white Americans
enjoy the privilege of not having to think about race and racism
as often as Americans of color do.262 Understandably, white
Americans may not notice implicit and even explicit acts or
patterns of racial bias because it does not impact them.263 The
same is true for corporate managers.264 As white Americans, they
communities).
257. See Corporate Environmental Responsibility, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/corporate-environmental-responsibility/en/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (identifying companies that adopt a “global citizen”
mindset and adopt energy and pollution-conservation measures that in turn
have led to “the implementation of top-down internal policies which put word to
actions as well as encouraging internal grassroots movements.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
258. See Danny Wilson, Corporate Environmental Responsibility, HARV. POL.
REV. (Oct. 4, 2010), http://harvardpolitics.com/online/hprgument-blog/corporateenvironmental-responsibility/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing the “recent
expansion of corporate social responsibility to include environmental issues”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
259. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(opening up corporate potential to pursue worthy corporate goals related to
race).
260. See Greenberg, supra note 226, at 76 (discussing the biases pervasive in
corporations and corporate culture generally).
261. See Smedley & Smedley, supra note 210 (discussing the implications of
the “assignation of race”).
262. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and
the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 185 (2005) (identifying the reality
of unconscious bias, but the different cognitions of race experienced by African
Americans and whites).
263. See id. at 184 (describing the “modern racists” who may “genuinely” not
believe themselves to be racist).
264. See Greenberg, supra note 226, at 76 (noting the role corporate leaders
can and should take on in grappling with their own racial biases and those
existing at their companies).
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may not pick up on or understand systemic racism that taints
hiring, promotion and pay practices, and relationships with
consumers and communities of color.265 The attribution of race, or
more particularly whiteness, to the corporation may inspire
deeper thought regarding race and racism within firms.266 When
white executives and managers understand that they are working
for a white firm, the racial differences between the corporation on
the one hand, and stakeholders of color on the other, may clarify
the racial realities within corporate cultures for business
leaders.267 This will help them to more adequately monitor
compliance with anti-discrimination law.268
But corporate leaders infrequently discuss or think about
race discrimination.269 Most corporate discourse, thought or
disclosure about people of color focuses on diversity—racial
diversity among employees,270 or ways to convince consumers of
color to do business with a firm.271 This is stakeholder theory in
action.272 Unfortunately, however, considering the number of race
discrimination claims brought by workers and evidence of
265. See Reeves, supra note 230 (illustrating a corporate hiring process
tainted by systemic racism).
266. See Page, supra note 262, at 185 (discussing the need to unravel or
wind back biases through identifying as a white business and by doing so make
corporate managers cognizant and more responsive to stakeholders of color).
267. See Cheryl L. Wade, “We Are an Equal Opportunity Employer”:
Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541, 1582 (2004) (finding that
management understanding racial realities through identifying themselves as a
white corporation has been insufficient to resolve persistent discriminatory
corporate culture).
268. See Wade, supra note 224, at 389 (discussing the implications of
complying with antidiscrimination monitoring as an immense net gain for a
corporation).
269. See Page, supra note 262, at 185 (recognizing an “unconsciousness”
with respect to race).
270. See Wade, supra note 267, at 1582 (explaining that companies say that
diversity is a priority even while failing to confront persisting discrimination).
271. See Roy S. Ginsburg, Diversity Makes Cents: The Business Case for
Diversity, 2014 A.B.A SECTION ANNUAL CONFERENCE SECTION OF LITIG. (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/material
s/2014_sac/2014_sac/diversity_makes_cents.authcheckdam.pdf (introducing a
focus on diversity as an avenue for business expansion and development).
272. See Sheehy, supra note 246, at 201 (describing a corporation’s effects on
society and the need for those affected in society, by a corporate diversity focus,
to have an influence and voice in corporate action).
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discrimination against consumers, companies do not seem to do
as well as they claim when it comes to compliance with
anti-discrimination law (a corporate governance issue).273 The
lack of racial diversity among employees, and the impact of
discriminatory practices that negatively impact consumers,
indicates a lack of corporate compliance with anti-discrimination
law and a failure to consider stakeholder interests.274
After Hobby Lobby, it is clear that for-profit corporations may
pursue socially responsible goals (however defined) while they
pursue profits.275 The resistance to corporate social responsibility
has typically revolved around the idea that such efforts would
run contrary to the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.276
Hobby Lobby, however, makes clear the fact that profit
maximization is not synonymous with corporate purpose.277
For-profits may pursue any lawful purpose or business,278 and
may even pursue socially responsible goals that reduce
shareholder wealth.279 This makes obsolete the debate about
whether a business case for diversity can be articulated. A
273. See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.
cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that 31,027 race discrimination
employment claims were filed in fiscal year 2015) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
274. See Wade, supra note 267, at 1582 (identifying the failure to follow
through on prioritizing diversity and rooting out racial discrimination is
indicative of a failure to consider stakeholder, and by extension society’s
interests).
275. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(finding that pursuit of environmental and religious objectives is fully allowable
under the law).
276. See Dodge v. Ford, for the leading decision which has been interpreted
to support the long-standing notion that corporations should be run in a manner
that maximizes shareholder wealth and profits. 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919).
277. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (concluding that pursuit of
religious objectives may take precedence should owners so desire).
278. See id. (referencing modern corporate law’s tenet that “each American
jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to
be formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose or business”)
(citing 1 J. COX & T. HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4:1, at 224
(3d ed. 2010)).
279. See id. (discussing the aforementioned environmental and working
conditions objectives and their permissibility notwithstanding any adverse
impact such objectives may have on shareholder wealth).
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business case for diversity is no longer needed.280 After Hobby
Lobby, for-profits are freer to think more deeply about the
seemingly intractable problems of racial inequities within their
firms and problematic relationships between their firms and
stakeholders of color.281
VIII. Context
In this Part, I provide context for the preceding discussion. I
describe predatory lending by firms that victimized Americans of
color.282 Of course, the predatory lenders were subject to
mandates to comply with anti-discrimination law.283 It is hard to
imagine why compliance programs did not reveal pervasive race
discrimination at the firms involved.284 My discussion in this Part
supports the idea that a more frank discussion about racial
difference and discrimination—both implicit and explicit—can
lead to more effective compliance.285 Acknowledging that the
280. See Dorie Clark, Making the Business Case for Diversity, FORBES (Aug.
21, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2014/08/21/makingthe-business-case-for-diversity/#5a85b37919b3 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(adopting the idea that a business case for diversity is necessary before
corporate management will prioritize it) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
281. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(noting that the pursuit of objectives other than profit maximization permits
corporate decision-makers to set their corporate agenda for “worthy” objectives).
282. See Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory
Lenders Use Minorities to target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 165, 170 (2010) (describing targeted marketing of minorities by
predatory lenders); see also WEI LI ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
PREDATORY PROFILING: THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LOCATION OF
PAYDAY LENDERS IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/
california/ca-payday/research-analysis/predatory-profiling.pdf (noting in its
report that African Americans and Latinos make up a disproportionate share of
payday loan borrowers).
283. See id. at 199 (recognizing that liability may arise under
antidiscrimination laws for practices that predatory lenders may otherwise
claim as effective marketing strategies). This idea was noted by the court in
Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 22 (D.D.C. 2000).
284. See Wade, supra note 224, at 390 (noting the economic consequences of
non-compliance, but questioning why racial discrimination’s extensiveness did
not raise red flags).
285. See id. (supporting the need for a new approach to incentivize corporate
compliance with antidiscrimination law).
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overwhelming majority of the firms that engaged in predatory
lending were “white” firms (i.e., explicitly racializing them), and
acknowledging that the firms’ victims were people of color are
important steps toward accomplishing this.286
Banks and other financial institutions targeted people of
color—African Americans in particular—for high-interest
predatory mortgages.287 Studies have found that “[m]ortgage
originators relaxed their standards to offer subprime mortgages,
and in some instances, engaged in fraud so that they could lend
money at high rates of interest and therefore make more
money.”288 Many consumers of color who qualified for prime or
low-interest mortgages were offered only subprime, high-interest
loans.289 Some consumers of color who did not qualify for
286. See Powell & Watt, supra note 202, at 899 (discussing the positive
consequences that would flow from racializing corporations).
287. See Wade, supra note 84, at 447 (arguing that “[r]eforming the
secondary mortgage market will be futile” unless the underlying unfair
treatment of minorities before the 2008 crisis is tackled head on). For example, a
former Wells Fargo credit officer revealed in a sworn statement that the bank
targeted African American borrowers for high-interest loans they could not
afford because of the pervasive perception at the bank that African American
customers were not savvy enough to figure out that the loans offered them were
predatory. See id. at 440 (finding a “prevailing attitude” among lenders that
“African-American customers weren't savvy enough to know they were getting a
bad loan” (citing testimony from Michael Powell, Suit Accuses Wells Fargo of
Steering Blacks to Subprime Mortgages in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009,
at A1)). Another loan officer admitted that African Americans who qualified for
prime loans were targeted for subprime loans because when loan officers
referred borrowers who qualified for low-interest loans to the subprime division,
they earned bonuses and higher fees. See id. (finding that loan officers could
earn “bonuses when they referred borrowers who qualified for low-interest loans
to the subprime division” (citing reports from Michael Powell, Suit Accuses Wells
Fargo of Steering Blacks to Subprime Mortgages in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2009, at A1)). “Yet another Wells Fargo loan officer revealed that African
Americans were called ‘mud people’ and the predatory loans offered them were
labeled ‘ghetto loans.’” Id. Loan officers targeted black churches also. See id.
(noting reports that certain corporate divisions did so because Wells Fargo
believed “church leaders had a lot of influence and could convince congregants to
take out subprime loans” (citing reports from Michael Powell, Suit Accuses Wells
Fargo of Steering Blacks to Subprime Mortgages in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2009, at A1))).
288. See id. at 437 (noting that this practice predictably resulted in
borrowers’ inability to repay their mortgages).
289. See, e.g., MONIQUE W. MORRIS, NAACP A SUMMARY OF THE DISPARATE
IMPACT OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING ON AFRICAN AMERICANS 2–3 (2009),
https://action.naacp.org/page/-/resources/Lending_Discrimination.pdf
(finding
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low-interest mortgages were offered subprime loans even though
they had no or low incomes and no assets.290 Lenders told their
customers “that they would be able to pay off their mortgages as
housing prices climbed”.291 But, it became clear that this was not
true as “the housing bubble burst and housing prices
plummeted.”292 Predictably, “many borrowers could not repay
these predatory loans.”293 The mortgages, however, had been
pooled together to create securities that were sold to investors.294
Banks and lenders were able to transfer foreseeable risks that
borrowers would default on the underlying mortgages to investors
who purchased the securities.295 These are risks that should have
been anticipated by lenders and the experts who advised them,
but were understandably unforeseen by borrowers with no
economic expertise.296
Billions of dollars in wealth was drained from African
American and Latino families when banks foreclosed on the
homes of consumers who were victims of this predatory
lending.297 Communities were infested with unsightly, abandoned
that African American borrowers were more likely to receive subprime loans
than similarly-situated white borrowers); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S.
Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: the Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of
Subprime Mortgages, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3–4 (2006), http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/rr011-Unfair_Lending0506.pdf (evaluating several studies and finding that higher-income African
American and Latino borrowers were more likely to receive higher-rate loans
than similarly-situated white borrowers).
290. See Wade, supra note 84, at 438 (noting that minorities were “targeted”
specifically for subprime loans).
291. See Cheryl D. Wade, Predatory Lending in the Context of Home
Ownership Continues in 2016 Under Another Name, CORP. JUST. BLOG (May 3,
2016),
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/predatory-lending-incontext-of-home.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (examining lending to
unqualified buyers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See Cheryl L. Wade, How Predatory Mortgage Lending Changed
African American Communities and Families, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 437 (2012);
Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1191
(2011) (discussing to whom blame is owed for the financial crisis and its adverse
effects on minority borrowers).
297. See Wade, supra note 84, at 438 (describing the expanding wealth gap
that will result from African Americans losing billions due to subprime lending)
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homes.298 Investors who purchased mortgage-backed securities
lost billions.299 Predatory lending harmed local, national, and
global economies and helped to precipitate the economic
downturn of 2008.300
In the aftermath of the predatory mortgage lending that
targeted African Americans and Latinos, and even after the
passage of Dodd–Frank, enacted, in part, to address this
misconduct, the predatory practices used in the mortgage context
have been replicated in the auto industry.301 Auto dealers often
connect auto buyers to lenders.302 The dealers are allowed to
engage in discretionary pricing when setting interest rates and
there is evidence that dealers charge consumers of color more for
their auto loans than they charge similarly situated white
consumers.303
(citing Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to
Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REV. 677, 680 (2009) (noting that the
wealth gap has increased because foreclosures have disproportionately impacted
African Americans)).
298. See Wade, supra note 84, at 440–41 (discussing the increased
vulnerability that resulted from abandoned homes and the resulting burden on
law enforcement and cities to deal with the problems).
299. See id. at 437–38 (noting the financial crisis’ immense adverse impact
on global economies).
300. See id. at 437 (describing the contributions to the economic downturn
and underlying effects).
301. See Putting an End to Abusive Car Loans, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/opinion/sunday/putting-an-end-to-abusivecar-loans.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (beginning the article by
declaring auto loans to be a “bastion of predatory lending and racial
discrimination”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
302. See id. (discussing how auto dealers and lenders profit by making “auto
loans that contain hidden figure charges and other essentially useless add-ons
like credit insurance”).
303.
Data from the late 1990s to early 2000s obtained in nationwide cases
against the major auto lenders brought by the National Consumer
Law Center…showed widespread racial disparities, unrelated to
credit risk, in the markups added by auto dealers to auto loan rates.
In practices similar to today, the auto dealers had discretion whether
and how much to markup rates already priced for credit risk by the
auto lenders.
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN AUTO LOAN MARKUPS, STATEBY-STATE DATA (2005) https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/ib-auto-dealersracial_disparites.pdf; see also Van Jones, Congress Says ‘OK’ to racist auto
lenders, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/16/opinions/jones-discrimination-
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Even more disturbing is the fact that predatory conduct in
the context of home ownership continues in 2016 under another
name.304 On April 18, 2016, the New York Times reported on a
relatively new practice that targets low-income homebuyers who
are now unable to get mortgages because they lost homes in the
recent downturn, and because banks are now more likely to
adhere to lending standards.305 The deals allow home sellers to
provide consumers with high-interest, long-term loans that are
known as contracts for deed.306 If the consumer can repay the
loan in installments on time, he or she will own the home.307 But
two things impede borrowers’ ability to pay on time. First, the
interest rates are exorbitantly high.308 Once again, we see the
terribly familiar practice of imposing interest rates that make
repayment difficult if not impossible.309 Second, many of the
homes are in a state of disrepair and consumers need to spend

auto-lenders/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2015, 3:31 PM) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(describing the “solid evidence that black, Latino, and Asian-American car
buyers are charged higher interest rates than white Americans with similar
credit histories.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Ally Bank,
Honda Finance, and Fifth Third Bank settled with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the Department of Justice in order to pay back
victimized consumers. Id. Toyota has also agreed to pay millions in restitution
to thousands of consumers of color after charging them interest rates that were
higher than those charged to white borrowers with similar credit histories. See
Lisa Lambert, Toyota Motor Credit Settles with U.S. over Racial Bias in Auto
Loans, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-consumersautofinance-toyota-idUSKCN0VB2EO (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (reporting
Toyota’s $21.9 million restitution settlement) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
304. See Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Wall St. Veterans Are
Betting on Low-Income Homebuyers, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2016, at B1
(introducing the “contracts for deed” concept).
305. See id. (finding that banks are now “unwilling to write mortgages to
riskier clients after being fined billions of dollars for pushing borrowers into
unaffordable subprime mortgages before the crisis”).
306. See id. (describing contracts deeds as those deals where “a seller
provides the buyer with a long-term, high-interest loan, with the promise of
actually owning the home at the end of it”).
307. Id.
308. See id. (referencing the case of a millennial who is required to pay ten
percent interest under the terms of her contract deed for a house).
309. See Wade, supra note 291 (referencing the impossibility of repaying
some of these predatory loans, but finding continued proliferation nonetheless).
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money to make the home habitable.310 When a prospective
homebuyer defaults on the contract for deed, the lender may
convert the contract to a month-to-month tenancy.311 Even worse,
the laws that protect homeowners who default on mortgages from
eviction do not apply in this context.312
While this practice targets low-income homebuyers, there is
no reliable information available regarding the race of the
homebuyers. But, it is likely that a disproportionately large
number of these homebuyers are consumers of color because, as a
result of centuries of economic discrimination in the U.S., people
of color are overrepresented among low-income consumers.313
The achievement of race, gender, and viewpoint diversity
among corporate leaders is essential in addressing many of the
economic disparities that big business has helped to create
between white Americans and Americans of color.314 Johnson and
Millon’s work demands this.315 While their work does not focus on
racial wealth and income gaps, it provides a theoretical
foundation on which practical considerations and resolutions may
be fashioned for many corporate governance issues including the
ones I address in this Essay.316
310. See Stevenson & Goldstein, supra note 304, at B1. (noting that the
“homes are often sold “as is,” in need of costly repairs and renovations, and
many of the transactions end in eviction when buyers fall behind on payments”).
311. See id. (discussing how the home sale documents often “did not provide
buyers with a specified time period to remedy a default, give Harbour the right
to immediately convert the agreement to a month-to-month tenancy upon a
default, and include an arbitration clause for settling some disputes”).
312. See id. (finding that contracts for deed benefit investment firms
especially because “contracts, buyers can be evicted if they default on their
loans. That is very different from traditional mortgages, under which the
foreclosure process can be lengthy and costly”).
313. See
Class
Divides,
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
21,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/node/21678814 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing
the past oppression leading to current disadvantages for the black population
and a resulting “achievement gap” between white Americans and Americans of
color) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
314. See supra notes 202 and 222 and accompanying text (noting the need
for diversity and race consciousness at the corporate management level).
315. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (discussing the future
implications of corporate social responsibility after Hobby Lobby).
316. See Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2 and accompanying
text (noting how compliance with the law interacts with corporate social
responsibility).
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Focusing on the notion of corporate personhood adds a new
layer of corporate accountability. Consideration of the details of
the identity of corporate persons helps to hone and refine
expectations for the corporate person’s social responsibility.317
Understanding how social constructions of personal identity,
particularly the social construction of race, illuminates subtle,
covert, or implicit bias that infects the economic relationships
between corporations and constituents of color.318 In other words,
explicit identification of corporations as white, as determined
culturally in the way natural persons are deemed white, may
shed light on discriminatory dealings with employees, consumers,
and communities of color.319
IX. Conclusion
In this Essay, I explore the possibility of creating corporate
cultures that promote rather than suppress racial equity. In
order for this to happen, business leaders must understand the
impact that continuing societal discrimination has on corporate
cultures. Large public companies employ hundreds, sometimes
thousands of people who will interact with other employees,
communities and consumers of color, and minority-owned
businesses.320 Even closely-held, family-owned companies like
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga employ thousands.321 Implicit or
317. See supra notes 202 and 233 (arguing for corporate personhood to come
to grips with race as a component of corporate social responsibility).
318. See supra note 205 (arguing for viewing race as a social construction).
319. See Wade, supra note 267 (noting that this explicit identification is a
crucial step in challenging the United States’ persistently discriminatory
corporate culture).
320. See Claire Zillman & Stacy Jones, 7 Fortune 500 Companies with the
Most
Employees,
FORTUNE
(June
13,
2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/06/13/fortune-500-most-employees/ (last updated Aug.
17, 2015 12:03 PM) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing how, for example,
retail giants, who have “mammoth rosters” of employees interacting with
millions of consumers and clients, constitute four of the seven largest companies
ranked by employment numbers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
321. See Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/ourstory (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that Hobby Lobby employs
“approximately 32,000 people”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
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unconscious racism that affects the relationships between
for-profit companies and their constituents of color is inevitable
because the individuals who act on behalf of these companies live
in a nation in which racism and discrimination endure.322 The
racism that continues to plague our national culture is in some
instances unconscious, implicit, and subtle.323 Sometimes it is
blatant and overt. Whatever its manifestation, the racism that
continues to be part of U.S. culture impacts corporate cultures
and shapes the relationships between public companies and their
constituents of color.324
For-profit companies, however, are a promising locus for
cultural transformation as it relates to race and racism.325 This is
because norms are homogenous in the corporate context.326
Individualism reigns in U.S. culture. But in corporate cultures,
individuals have to conform to the norms and priorities
established by the CEO and other senior executives.327 This is
why a focus on corporate governance is an important first step
toward racial reconciliation.
The Hobby Lobby case changes the way we should think
about corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.328
322. See Bornstein, supra note 223 (discussing the far-reaching
consequences to society and those living and doing business within it when
implicit discrimination is so entrenched).
323. See id. (describing in greater detail the various manifestations of
implicit or unconscious discrimination).
324. See supra notes 201 and 224–225 (discussing the disproportionate
effects felt by stakeholders of color when corporate managers fail to address
racism).
325. See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 364
(1992) (discussing the view that racism is a permanent feature of the American
landscape, that black-over-white ascendancy and the need for profits drive it,
and that the status quo will persist without greater initiative from, among
others, for-profit companies).
326. See Jens Dammann, Homogeneity Effects in Corporate Law, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1103, 1107 (2014) (finding corporate norms homogenous, and by extension
compatible, because all corporations use the same corporate law regime that
empowers executives).
327. See id. (arguing that corporate homogeneity is akin to economic utility
analysis and that corporate law’s general regime evidences the overall corporate
utility inherent to homogeneity in this respect).
328. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(finding that pursuing objectives besides profit-maximization is permissible and
even encouraged because those other objectives satisfy the “any lawful purpose”
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The work of Lyman Johnson and David Millon helps us navigate
the impact of the Court’s Hobby Lobby decision and extrapolates
what we need to know about how corporations may be
governed.329
After Hobby Lobby, we know that there is no obligation
under the law to maximize shareholder wealth. 330 In fact,
corporations, even for-profits, may reduce wealth for the sake of
stakeholders or the general welfare of the public under the
Court’s reasoning.331 Johnson and Millon noted that this
approach carries significant implications for companies
concerned about their social goals and responsibilities. 332
Rejecting the idea that the solitary goal of a for-profit is to
maximize profits has interesting implications for corporate
social responsibility advocates. 333 Hobby Lobby removes a
longstanding barrier to corporate social responsibility by
standard).
329. See supra notes 1–2 (discussing openings for corporate social
responsibility after Hobby Lobby allowed corporate goals without sole regard for
profit maximization).
330. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (finding that pursuit of religious
objectives was a worthy goal that was not precluded under corporate law).
331. See id. (arguing that disregard for profit-maximization for religious
objectives could be extended to other worthy objectives as well).
332. See supra notes 1–2 (discussing the new corporate landscape and
openings created by Hobby Lobby).
333. The Court’s approach in Hobby Lobby to ideas about shareholder
primacy and stakeholder theory is also informative. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2771 (construing state statutes permitting incorporation for “any lawful
purpose” broadly and unburdened by a restrictive, exclusive shareholder wealth
maximization objective). The Court rejected shareholder primacy in its
traditional sense by acknowledging that for-profit corporations do not have to
defer to shareholder interests and may disregard non-shareholder interests. See
id. (concluding that modern corporate law does not and cannot impose a
requirement on corporations to “pursue profit at the expense of everything
else”). But interestingly, the Court upheld the idea of shareholder primacy in a
noneconomic sense. See id. (questioning why religious objectives should be
treated differently than other accepted charitable or altruistic pursuits by
corporations). The religious objectives of the shareholders of Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga were paramount. See id. at 2774 (noting the closely held status of the
companies and the undisputed “sincerity of their religious beliefs”). The
interests of both companies’ women employees in having access to certain
contraceptives were not protected. See id. at 2775 (concluding that the HHS
contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion”). The
shareholders’ religious objectives prevailed over the interests of stakeholders.
Id. at 2775.
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holding that for-profits may pursue other goals as they pursue
profits.334

334. See id. at 2771 (finding that worthy objectives are permissible under
the law and shattering the long-held notion that the sole objective of for-profit
corporations was to maximize profits, and therefore, maximize shareholder
wealth).

